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As Goes Maine? The 1996 Maine Clean Election Act:
Innovations and Implications for Future Campaign
Finance Reforms at the State
and Federal Level
Deborah E. Schneider*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1996 elections prompted the emphatic pronouncement that
America’s campaign finance system was out of control.1 Political
campaign fundraising during the 1996 election cycle fostered
numerous allegations of, and investigations into, illegal and improper
activities as well as producing a striking picture of the influence of
money in politics.2 This led many observers to charge the fundraising
* J.D. 1999, Washington University.
1. See Anthony Corrado, Giving, Spending, and “Soft Money,” 6 J.L. & POL’Y 45 (1997)
(“Our country’s current campaign finance system is simply not working”); CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 379 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]
(observing that in 1996 America’s campaign finance system “went from the political equivalent
of a low-grade fever to Code Blue— from a chronic problem needing attention sooner or later to
a crisis”); Brooks Jackson, Financing the 1996 Campaign: The Law of the Jungle, in TOWARD
THE MILLENNIUM: THE ELECTIONS OF 1996 225, 256 (Larry J. Sabato ed., 1997) [hereinafter
TOWARD THE MILLENNIUM] (noting that the 1996 fundraising abuses marked the “final collapse
of campaign finance regulations enacted 22 years earlier in the wake of the Watergate
scandal”).
2. See Rebecca Carr & Jackie Koszczuk, Probe Reports Decry Abuses, But Overhaul
Still Unlikely, 56 CONG. Q., 371 (detailing findings from the U.S. Senate’s 1997 campaign
finance investigation reports which revealed a myriad of fundraising abuses by both political
parties); Anthony Corrado, Party Soft Money, in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 167; Ruth
Marcus, Democrats Cite Links Between GOP, Issue Ads: Report Says Candidates Raised
Unreported Cash, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1998, at A27. Such activities included accepting
possible illegal foreign campaign contributions, hosting private White House coffees and
overnight stays in the Lincoln Bedroom for contributors donating $100,000 or more, and
violating federal spending limits. Id.
See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 10 MYTHS ABOUT MONEY AND POLITICS (1995);
David E. Rosenbaum, In Political Money Game, the Year of Big Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 1996, at A1 (discussing the record-breaking amounts of money raised during the 1996
election cycle). The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), a non-profit, non-partisan research
organization which studies the role of money in elections documented the following statistics:
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excesses and abuses at the federal level with creating the most
significant controversy since the 1972 Watergate scandal.3
While Congressional investigations and the media’s spotlight
continues to remain focused on allegations of illegal fundraising
activities, a growing majority of citizens4 and campaign finance
experts5 are equally troubled by campaign fundraising practices that
(1) approximately one-third of one percent of the American public made a campaign
contribution of $200 or more to a federal candidate in the 1991-92 election cycle; (2) only four
percent of the American public made a campaign contribution of any amount, in 1980, 1984, or
1992; (3) “[t]he residents of one zip-code area— 10021— on New York City’s Upper East Side
contributed more money to Congress during the 1994 Elections than did all the residents of
each of 21 states”; (4) the U.S. House candidate who spent the most money in 1994 won 90
percent of the elections. Id. Operating under this system, 95 percent of incumbents won re-
election in 1996. 95 Percent of Incumbents Win Reelection in 1996, Aided by Dramatic
Fundraising Advantage over Challengers, According to Common Cause (visited Nov. 7, 1996)
<http.//www.commoncause.org/publicatins/11-71sdy.html>. See generally Center for
Responsive Politics, 1996 Election Report (visited Feb. 10, 1998) <http://www.crp.org/pubs/
bigpicture/bpstats.html>.
3. Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law,
in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 35. Even veteran campaign finance reporter Brooks Jackson
observed that “[w]atching the hundreds of millions of dollars spent in the 1996 elections,
citizens might be surprised to find that there were any laws limiting campaign finance at all.”
TOWARD THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 1, at 225. For example, one corporation gave nearly
$2.2 million to the Republican party even though corporate contributions made in connection
with federal elections have been illegal since 1907. Id. The American Federation of Labor-
Congress of industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) spent approximately $22 million in targeted
congressional districts on negative television ads aimed at Republicans, even though union
contributions made in support of federal candidates have been illegal since 1943. Id. See
generally TOWARD THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 1, (providing an overview of improper and
illegal 1996 fundraising activities); Washington’s Other Scandal (visited Oct. 7, 1998)
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/scandal> (detailing both political parties’
money chase in the 1996 election cycle).
4. See Center For Responsive Politics, Poll (visited Feb. 15, 1998) <http://www.crp.org/
pubs/survey/top.html> (highlighting an April 1997 poll finding that 66 percent of Americans
believe the influence of political contributions on elections and government policy is a major
problem).
5. See Campaign Finance Investigations, 1996: Hearings Before the U.S. Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Ellen S. Miller, Executive
Director of Public Campaign) (“[M]ost of what is wrong with the [campaign finance] system is
perfectly legal . . . The real scandal is the day-to-day corruption of the democratic process that
takes place when all candidates— except the personally wealthy ones— are dependent on private
special-interest money to finance their election campaigns.”); Jamin Rasking & John Bonifaz,
Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 277-78 (1993)
(asserting that the private campaign finance system “[i]nvites the kickback, the sweetheart
relationship, and the de facto bribe, but also undermines the very essence of democracy”); J.
Skelly Wright, Money And The Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to
Political Equality? 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982) (“Concentrated wealth . . . threatens to
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are legal under the current private campaign finance system.6 Four
fundamental problems exist7: (1) campaign spending continues to
skyrocket;8 (2) politicians are preoccupied with fundraising rather
than their official duties;9 (3) special interests exercise undue
distort political campaigns and referenda. The voices of individual citizens are being drowned
out in election campaigns . . . . If the ideal of equality is trampled there, the principle of ‘one
person, one vote,’ the cornerstone of our democracy, becomes a hollow mockery.”). See also
Marty Jezer & Ellen Miller, Money Politics: Campaign Finance and the Subversion of
American Democracy, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 467 (1994); Marty Jezer et
al., A Proposal for Democratically Financed Congressional Elections, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 333 (1993); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in “Faulty Assumptions”: A
Response to Professor Smith’s Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN. L. REV. 867
(1998).
6. For instance, Alabama State Senator Charles D. Bishop describes a scenario familiar
to most state legislatures:
It’s legal in Alabama, for instance, if there is a bill on the floor to address an envelope
[to me], and I’m walking out of the Senate floor, and one these people can walk up to
me and hand me a check for $10,000 and say to me: ‘Senator, now this is for your next
campaign. This is not anything to do with swaying your vote on the bill.’ That’s legal
in Alabama and it’s rotten.
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, MONEY IN POLITICS REFORM: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS,
AND PROPOSALS 6 (1996).
7. See generally Public Campaign, Clean Money Campaign Reform (visited Mar. 1,
1998) <http://www.publicampaign.org/cleanmoney.html> [hereinafter Public Campaign].
8. In 1996, U.S. congressional candidate campaign spending totaled over $2 billion with
state and local candidate spending costing another $2 billion. KENNETH N. WEINE, THE FLOW
OF MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 1 (1997). Since 1976, the aggregate cost of U.S.
House and U.S. Senate general election campaigns increased from $99 million to $626 million
in 1996. Id. at 17. In 1976, the average House candidate spent $87,200 to win a race and
$661,000 in 1996, while the average Senate candidate spent $609,100 in 1976 and $3.6 million
in 1996. Id. But see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 Yale L.J. 1059, 1049-62 (1996) (rejecting the notion that too
much money is spent on political campaigns).
9. The current fundraising climate harkens back to former U.S. Senator Mark Hanna’s
famous observation in 1895: “There are only two things that are important things in politics.
The first is money and I can’t remember what the second one is.” Helen Dewar, For Campaign
Finance Reform, A Historically Uphill Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1997, at A5. Many current
and former candidates attest the inordinate amount of time they must devote to raising
campaign funds. Former Congressman Jeff Coopersmith (D-WA) acknowledged that the
“constant need to raise large sums of money convinced me not to run for re-election. Last time I
spent 75 percent of my time raising money. It shouldn’t be that way.” Dellums Announces
Resignation; Capps Set to Run, CONGRESS DAILY (Nat’l Journal Group, Washington, D.C.)
Nov. 20, 1997, at 1. In her Sunday, January 11, 1998 appearance on NBC’s “Meet the Press,”
then-U.S. Senate candidate Geraldine Ferraro explained to interviewer Tim Russert how she
conducted her 1998 campaign: “I got on the phone on Tuesday. I spent Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday and Friday on the phone, eight hours a day [fundraising] . . . . Now, I’m going to
remain on that phone for the rest of the next three months.” Greg Pierce, Inside Politics, WASH.
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influence in the electoral system;10 and (4) potential candidates
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1998, at A5.
Moreover, many agree that such time-consuming fundraising impairs elected officials’ job
performance. See MARTIN SCHRAM, SPEAKING FREELY: FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
TALK ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS 1 (1995) [hereinafter SPEAKING FREELY] (presenting in-
depth interviews with former members of Congress regarding their personal experiences with
campaign fundraising); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising:
Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1994) (arguing that “[t]he quality of representation has to suffer when
legislators continually concerned about re-election are not able to spend the greater part of their
workday on matters of constituent service, information gathering, political and policy analysis
. . . .”). Former lawmakers attest to the detrimental effects of constant fundraising. Former
Representative Vin Weber (R-MN) explains “the amount of time people have to put into raising
money is a serious problem in the country . . . when the members making decisions can’t devote
serious quality time to serious decisions, it has to (result in) a lower quality of work.” SPEAKING
FREELY, at 38. Former Representative Leslie Byrne (D-VA) recalls that, as a lawmaker, she
was “constantly drawn by the siren song of trying to raise money for your race . . . . A very real
distraction from the real business of legislating.” Id.
10. See Jezer, supra note 5, at 340 (describing how “special interests usually target their
contributions to those candidates who sit on legislative committees” responsible for policy-
making in the area(s) of the special interests’ concerns); Tom R. Moore & Richard D. La Belle
III, Public Financing of Elections: New Proposals to Meet New Obstacles, 13 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 863, 866 (1985) (noting the consensus among scholars supports the popular belief that the
larger the contribution, the greater potential it holds for actually corrupting the political
process); Richard N. Goodwin, Commentary, The Selling of Government is a Scandal Beyond
‘Reform’, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at A11 (“Does anyone really think that hundreds of
millions of dollars are being poured into political campaigns out of an excess of public-spirited
zeal? The reality is simply common sense: Most of those who give this money are making . . . a
business investment.”); Editorial, States Lead the Way in Cleaning Up Campaigns, USA
TODAY, May 1, 1997, at 1214 (citing a survey revealing that 80 percent of respondents believe
that special interests buy politicians).
In addition to the public’s perception, numerous empirical studies reveal a correlation
between special interests’ campaign contributions and lawmakers’ legislative activity. See
LARRY MAKINSON & JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN, OPEN SECRETS: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CONGRESSIONAL MONEY AND POLITICS (1996) (providing contributions profiles of each
member of the 1994 Congress and its standing committees that detail the industries, companies,
unions, and other organizations contributing to each candidate, outlining top recipient aside top
contributors and providing an overview of the role of political actions committees). Further,
many lawmakers attest to special interests’ ability to influence the legislative process through
campaign contributions. See SPEAKING FREELY, supra note 9. For example, former U.S.
Senator Wyche Fowler (D-GA) admits:
[I] am sure that on many occasions— I’m not proud of it— I made the choice that I
needed [contributions from] this big corporate client and therefore I voted for, or
sponsored its provision, even though I did not think that it was in the best interests of
the country or the economy.
Id. at 28. Former U.S. Representative Mel Levine (D-CA) reveals that “[o]n the tax side . . . the
appropriations side, decisions are clearly weighted and influenced . . . by who has contributed to
the candidates. The price that the public pays for this process, whether it’s in subsidies, taxes, or
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without personal wealth (or access to it) cannot fairly compete for
political office.11 Even elected officials, those most familiar with the
traditional private campaign finance system, concur that these
problems undermine the integrity of the electoral system.12
Accordingly, public support for comprehensive campaign finance
reform is at its highest level to date.13 Yet, despite overwhelming
public support, Congress has not enacted any significant campaign
finance reform legislation for over two decades.14
appropriations, is quite high.” Id. at 89. But see Smith, supra note 8, at 1068 (arguing that
money has not “corrupted” the electoral system and that some studies of voting patterns show
that campaign contributions affect very few legislative votes).
11. See Center for Responsive Politics, Poll, supra note 4 (revealing that 71 percent of
respondents believe “a major problem” [with the campaign finance system] is that the high cost
of financing a campaign discourages good people from running for office); Raskin & Bonifaz,
supra note 5, at 287-88 (contending that the campaigning costs have increased to the point that
“most people of average means cannot even contemplate” running for office); Rosenkranz,
supra note 5, at 884 (explaining that “[t]alented, brilliant, energetic, committed leaders need not
apply if they lack either a trust fund or the will, stomach, capacity, and contacts to raise large
sums of money”).
12. See SPEAKING FREELY, supra note 9. See also Cornelius P. McCarthy, Campaign
Finance: A Challenger’s Perspective on Funding and Reform, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 69, 73 (1997)
(detailing his personal experience with the frustrations of fundraising as a congressional
candidate and concluding that access to money has become the “preeminent qualification for
running . . . and often the only qualification”).
13. See Joel Bleifuss, Cleaning Up Elections, IN THESE TIMES, May 12, 1997, at 12
(citing an Apr. 8, 1997 New York Times/CBS News poll showing that “89 percent of
respondents supported a complete overhaul of the campaign finance system”). But see Bradley
A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulations and the First Amendment, 6 J.L. &
POL’Y 1 (1997) (rejecting the notion that campaign finance regulations require any reform).
14. Over the last decade the U.S. Senate held 29 hearings, interviewed 552 witnesses,
endured 17 filibusters, and took 133 votes on campaign finance reform, none of which
produced new reform laws. Public Campaign, The Money Meter (visited Feb. 1, 1998)
<http://www.publicampaign.com>. As a result, the U.S. has not seen significant federal
campaign finance reform laws since 1979. Anthony Corrado & Daniel R. Ortiz, Recent
Innovations, in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 337. Even in the wake of the scandals,
investigations, and a barrage of negative publicity surrounding the 1996 campaign fundraising
abuses, the 105th Congress failed to enact any campaign finance reform legislation. The United
States House of Representatives passed the Shays-Meehan campaign finance reform bill on
August 6, 1998. Helen Dewar, House Approves Campaign Finance Limits, WASH. POST, Aug.
7, 1998, at A1. However, the United States Senate failed to pass its companion reform bill, the
McCain-Feingold when, on September 10, 1998, supporters of the McCain-Feingold bill fell
eight votes short of the sixty needed to pass the bill. Helen Dewar, Campaign Finance Bill
Buried for Year; GOP Senators Sustain Filibuster, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1998, at A4. Given
Congress’ track record on campaign finance reform, commentators were not surprised by its
failures to enact reform. See Corrado & Ortiz, supra (calling the recent history of federal
campaign finance reform efforts “a tale of frustration” because each year Congress promises
reform but then fails to follow through); Editorial, A Plateful of Hypocrisy, WASH. POST, Nov.
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In contrast to congressional inaction, the states are implementing
reforms by passing campaign finance reform laws.15 Plagued by
political fundraising problems similar to those at the federal level,
several states enacted new campaign finance reform laws through
ballot initiatives.16 Maine voters enacted the most notable and
comprehensive of such reforms by passing the Maine Clean Election
Act (MCEA).17 The MCEA represents an innovative legislative
scheme because it establishes the nation’s first voluntary, full-public
financing alternative for political campaigns.18
Although a majority of Maine voters and commentators supported
the MCEA’s reforms, the law did encounter opposition.19 Soon after
6, 1997, at A22 (noting that “Congress will shortly go home with both parties pretty well
pleased with what they have been able to accomplish in the field of campaign finance reform:
nothing . . . . Year after year they pull it off. . . .”).
15. See Editorial, Vermont’s Bid for Better Politics, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 1997, at D6
(observing that “[w]hile members of Congress and the president look for ways to avoid action
on campaign finance reform, individual states” have addressed the issue directly); Editorial,
States Taking Initiative on Voting Reform, BOSTON GLOBE, June 9, 1997, at A3 (noting that
“[s]tates across the country, frustrated by congressional gridlock on campaign finance reform,
are enacting tough new laws of their own”). See generally SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 337-
38 (detailing the history of statewide campaign finance reform initiatives). Beginning 1980, a
majority of states reformed their statewide campaign finance laws. Id. Nineteen ninety-one saw
ten states pass laws establishing or reducing campaign contribution limits while twenty-three
states and the District of Columbia revised their laws in significant ways during the 1992-1996
election cycle. Id. See generally William J. Connolly, Note, How Low Can You Go? State
Campaign Contribution Limits and the First Amendment, 76 B.U. L. REV. 483, 497 (1996)
(detailing the history of various statewide campaign finance reform legislation).
16. Like federal campaigns, the cost of state and local campaigns increased exponentially
over the last twenty years. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 337. Candidate spending for
statewide elections increased from $120 million in 1976 to $540 million in 1988; a 450 percent
increase. Id. State and local races began to mirror federal races in other ways: (1) candidates
began placing greater emphasis on fund-raising and political action committees (PACs); (2)
Candidates became increasingly dependent on large donors as the primary source of campaign
revenue; (3) incumbents outspent challengers by greater margins; and (4) the public’s
suspicions of the undue influence of political contributions increased. Id. at 338.
In 1996, seven states (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana,
and Nevada) approved campaign finance proposals through ballot initiatives. Id. at 340. See
also TOWARD THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 1, at 256; Eliza Newlin Carney, Taking on the Fat
Cats, NAT’L J., Jan. 18, 1997, at 110; Editorial, Campaign Reform Dead? Not According to
Public, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 1997, at 14A.
17. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31-1A, §§ 1001-201A, 1121-28 (Klest Supp. 1998). On
November 5, 1996, Maine voters passed the Maine Clean Election Act by a 56 percent to 44
percent margin. See infra Part III (detailing the history of the Act’s passage).
18. See infra Part III for an explanation of the MCEA’s provisions.
19. See RONALD KESSLER, INSIDE CONGRESS 240 (1997); Michael E. Campion, Note,
The Maine Clean Election Act: The Future of Campaign Finance Reform, 66 FORDHAM L.
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voters approved it, the National Right to Life Political Action
Committee (NRLPAC) and the Maine Civil Liberties Union (MCLU)
filed lawsuits challenging various provisions of the MCEA on First
Amendment grounds and seeking permanent injunctive relief
prohibiting its enforcement.20 However, United States District Court
Judge Brock Hornby dismissed the plaintiffs’ challenges on all
counts, holding that they lacked standing and that the legal issues
were not ripe for adjudication.21
Judge Hornby’s refusal to rule on the merits left open several legal
questions regarding the MCEA’s constitutionality and, assuming the
plaintiffs refile their lawsuit, such questions will likely arise again.22
Resolving these questions not only holds important implications for
Maine’s campaign finance system but for other campaign finance
REV. 2391 (1998); Robert Kuttner, Rescuing Democracy from “Speech,” THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 10, 13; Burt Neuborne, One Dollar, One Vote?, THE NATION,
Dec. 2, 1996, at 21; Public Should Pay for Campaigning, WIS. LEADER-TELEGRAM, July 7,
1997; Jonathan Rauch, How to Repair America’s Campaign Finance System, Part I: Give Pols
Free Money, No Rules, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 29, 1997-Jan. 5, 1998, at 54, 55; Sign
Up for Clean Elections, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1997, at A18; Paul Starr, The Loophole We
Can’t Close, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 6, 7; States Lead the Way in
Cleaning Up Campaigns, USA Today, May 1, 1997, at B1; A Worthy Experiment in Maine,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov., 1, 1996, at A26; Editorial, “Yes” On Question 3 Can Improve Elections,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 31, 1996, at 12A.
20. Six additional plaintiffs joined the MCLU. Some claimed they were candidates who
anticipated running for statewide office in Maine’s 2000 elections, others claimed they were
campaign contributors who anticipated making donations in Maine’s 2000 elections. Plaintiff’s
Complaint at 6-8, Daggett v. Devine, 973 F. Supp. 203 (D.Me. 1997) (No. 97-56-B-H, No. 96-
359-P-H).
The NRLPAC directed its principal challenge at the MCEA’s lowered campaign
contribution limits, claiming that they were impermissibly low in violation of the First
Amendment. Id. at 9-11. The MCLU directed its principal challenge to the MCEA’s alternative
public financing system, the “Clean Election Option,” claiming that it would effectively coerce
candidates to participate in the system and impermissibly burden the First Amendment rights of
potential candidates and their campaign contributors. Id. at 26-29.
21. Daggett v. Devine, 973 F. Supp. 203 (D. Me. 1997). The judge reasoned that it was
too soon to consider such legal challenges because there was too much time (over three years)
and too many intervening factors (such as the 1998 elections) before the year 2000 when the act
would take effect. Id. at 204. For instance, the plaintiffs’ future plans to run for political office
or to contribute to political campaigns might change, which would thereby affect whether they
were injured by the MCEA. Thus, the judge concluded that it was too difficult to determine
how the MCEA would harm the plaintiffs. Id. Currently, the MCEA is in the implementation
process.
22. The judge indicated there would be ample time to revisit the same legal challenges if
the plaintiffs brought them after the 1998 elections and before the MCEA provisions take effect
in the year 2000. Id. at 205.
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reform proposals modeled after the MCEA as well. Currently,
approximately twenty-five states are drafting or actively considering
legislation similar to the MCEA.23 The Vermont legislature has
already passed legislation modeled after the MCEA,24 and both
houses of Congress recently introduced similar bills.25
As the MCEA created the nation’s first voluntary, alternative full-
public financing system, this note analyzes the legal challenges
against it. Part II of this note examines the history of leading
campaign finance reform jurisprudence involving public financing
provisions while part III focuses on the MCEA and its legal
challenges. Part IV explains why the MCEA should be upheld as
constitutional and, finally, Part V suggests measures states should
consider when drafting legislation modeled after the MCEA to avoid
similar legal challenges.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORMS THROUGH
PUBLIC FINANCING PROVISIONS: LEADING CASES
Over the last two decades the federal courts addressed the
constitutionality of federal and state campaign finance reform laws,
including public financing provisions.26 This section reviews the
leading cases examining such provisions and the implications they
hold for resolving constitutional challenges to the MCEA.
23. Ellen S. Miller, Reform May be Dead in Congress— But Not in the States, THE HILL,
Oct. 22, 1997, at A12 (reporting that efforts to enact legislation similar to the MCEA through
1998 ballot initiatives are moving forward in Arizona and Massachusetts). State legislatures in
Connecticut, Illinois, and North Carolina are currently considering bills modeled after the
MCEA, and reform movements in support of MCEA-style reform are gaining momentum in
more than seventeen other states. Id.
24. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2853 (1997). On June 13, 1997, in response to Vermont
citizens’ successful grassroots lobbying efforts, Vermont’s state legislature enacted the
Vermont Campaign Finance Option.
25. On June 17, 1997, the “Clean Money, Clean Elections” bill, S.918, 105th Cong.
(1997) was introduced in the U.S. Senate. On July 17, 1997, the “Clean Money, Clean
Elections” bill, H.R. 2199, 105th Cong. (1997) was introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives.
26. “Public financing” refers to a legislative system that grants public funds to political
candidates to finance all or part of their campaigns. While public financing systems vary in
form, most condition the grant of public funds upon candidates’ agreement to limit their overall
campaign spending.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Public Financing Provisions in Federal Campaign Finance
Reform Legislation
1. Buckley v. Valeo
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of public financing
for electoral campaigns when it upheld a public financing provision
for presidential elections in the landmark campaign finance reform
decision, Buckley v. Valeo.27 In Buckley, the Court evaluated
constitutional challenges against amendments Congress’ made to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).28 While the Court
struck down limits on both the amount of money candidates could
expend on their campaigns and “independent expenditures” made by
non-candidates, it did uphold limits on campaign contributions to
candidates and FECA’s campaign finance reporting and disclosure
requirements.29 It also upheld FECA’s proviso allocating public funds
to presidential candidates who voluntarily agree to adhere to the
spending limits and forego private fundraising.30 In upholding
FECA’s public financing provision, the Court announced:
Congress may engage in public financing of election
campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on an
27. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
28. Id. at 6. The Court considered challenges to FECA’s four primary provision: (1)
campaign contribution limits; (2) campaign expenditure limits; (3) campaign finance reporting
and disclosure requirements; and (4) public funding grants to presidential candidates who
voluntarily agree to spending caps. Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 19-23, 39-51. The Court reasoned that limiting one’s campaign spending was
analogous to limiting one’s speech and thus the expenditure limits impaired candidates’ First
Amendment rights. Id. at 19-23. The Supreme Court has consistently held that individuals or
groups must remain free to make unlimited expenditures on a candidate’s behalf, so long as the
expenditures are independent from the candidate. Federal Election Comm’n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985); Federal Election Comm’n v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Colorado Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
The Court decided that contributing money to a candidate did not constitute a direct act of
expression and the government’s interest in deterring actual or apparent corruption caused by
large contributions was legitimate. Id. at 64-68, 74-82. The Court found that unlike the overall
limitations on contributions and expenditures, the disclosure requirements did not impose
ceilings on campaign-related activities. Id. at 64. The disclosure requirements can be found at
18 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1970 ed.).
30. Id. at 86.
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agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure
limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of
the contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forego
private fundraising and accept public funding.31
The Court reasoned that the public financing provision would not
abridge First Amendment values and in addition, served significant
state interests by preventing corruption— or at least the appearance of
corruption— by eliminating the improper influence of large private
campaign contributions and relieving candidates from the rigors of
soliciting private campaign contributions.32 By articulating the
contours of the FECA, the Court’s Buckley decision created a legal
framework that continues to guide campaign finance analysis.
2. Republican National Committee v. Federal Election
Commission
Four years after Buckley the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
constitutionality of conditioning public financing upon a candidate’s
agreement to limit his or her overall campaign spending in
Republican National Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission.33 There, the plaintiffs’ challenged FECA’s public
financing provision by claiming that it abridged their First
Amendment rights by forcing them to accept public financing while
restricting their campaign spending.34 In rejecting the plaintiffs’
argument and upholding the public financing provision, the district
court reasoned that the provision offered candidates a permissible
choice between engaging in unlimited private funding or accepting
limited public funding conditioned upon compliance with private
31. 424 U.S. 1 at 57 n.65.
32. Id. at 92-93, 96. The Court found that the public funding provision would not
“abridge, restrict, or censor speech.” Id. at 92. Rather, they would “facilitate and enlarge public
discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.” Id.
at 92-93.
33. 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980). See also Gary S.
Stein, The First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform: A Timely Reconciliation, 44
RUTGERS L. REV. 743, 775 (1992) (“Any doubt about the constitutionality of spending limits
imposed as a condition of public financing, however, was put to rest in Republican National
Committee v. Federal Election Commission.”).
34. 487 F. Supp. at 283.
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expenditure limits.35 The court explained that such a choice was
constitutional so long as it remained voluntary.36 Since the FECA
presented candidates with a voluntary choice between the two
funding alternatives, the district court concluded that the public
financing provision did not burden their First Amendment rights.37
However, the court did note that even if the provision did burden a
candidate’s First Amendment rights, the burden was justified by the
government’s significant interest in reducing the detrimental
influence large contributions have on the political process and
facilitating candidates’ communications with the electorate while
freeing candidates from the rigors of fundraising.38 The court found
that the public financing provision was narrow enough to meet these
compelling governmental interests.39
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court’s
decision.40 The Court agreed that where compelling governmental
interests exist, the government may condition the grant of public
funds to candidates who agree to adhere to the spending limits, even
at the expense of their First Amendment rights.41
B. Public Financing Provisions in Statewide Campaign Finance
Reform Legislation
After the Supreme Court approved public financing, the states
began to include various public financing provisions in their
campaign finance laws.42 They adopted such schemes because their
35. Id. at 284-86.
36. Id. at 285.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 91, 95-96).
39. Id. at 286-87 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
40. Republican Nat’l Comm’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
41. 487 F. Supp. at 285.
42. See BURT NEUBORNE, A SURVEY OF EXISTING EFFORTS TO REFORM THE CAMPAIGN
FINANCE SYSTEM 13 (Brennan Center for Justice Campaign Finance Reform Series 1997)
(noting that twenty-one states provide some type of public financing measure for state
candidates). Some form of direct public financing is made available to qualified candidates in
Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine (beginning in 2000), Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
EDWARD D. FEIGENBAUM & JAMES A. PALMER, FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW 98: A SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS WITH QUICK REFERENCE
CHARTS Chart 4 (1998).
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statewide campaigns under the traditional campaign finance system
were plagued with problems resembling those in federal campaigns.43
However, these states recognized that candidates would likely
hesitate to participate in a public financing system for fear of being
grossly outspent by their privately-financed opponents.44 Thus, in
order to encourage candidates’ participation in their public financing
systems, some states provided additional benefits to participating
candidates.45 Such benefits are commonly referred to as “triggers.”46
Opponents of triggers claim these incentives violate the First
Amendment by either punishing independent spenders on candidates
who do not accept the voluntary spending limits or coercing
candidates into accepting spending limits.47 This part examines lower
court cases addressing the constitutionality of trigger provisions in
public financing systems.
1. Vote Choice v. DiStefano
In Vote Choice v. DiStefano,48 the First Circuit upheld a trigger
provision included in Rhode Island’s 1992 amended campaign
finance statute. The statute provided limited public funds to
candidates who voluntarily agreed to abide by expenditure ceilings
and fundraising caps.49 The state agreed to match the money a
candidate raised from private sources up to a maximum of $750,000
if the candidate chose to participate.50 To encourage participation, the
statute included a contribution “cap gap,” which allowed
participating candidates to accept individual contributions twice the
43. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of four fundamental
problems with the private campaign finance system.
44. Kenneth N. Weine, Triggering the First Amendment: Why Campaign Finance Systems
That Include “Triggers” Are Constitutional, 24 J. LEGIS. 223, 226-27 (1998) (explaining why
publicly-funded candidates would fear being outspent by privately-financed opponents or their
supporters).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 227-32 (providing an explanation of various types of triggers and their
jurisprudence).
47. Id. at 223.
48. 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993).
49. Id. at 29-30.
50. Id. at 30.
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size of allowed contributions to non-participating candidates.51 If a
privately-financed opponent began to outspend the participating
candidate, the participating candidate could then exceed the original
spending limit, but only to the extent that the additional fundraising
matches the amount the opponent spent in excess of the original
limit.52 The plaintiffs claimed that this provision was unconstitutional
because it coerced candidates into participate in Rhode Island’s
public funding scheme.53
The First Circuit disagreed; instead, it found that the provision
offered candidates a “permissible choice” between running as a
privately-financed candidate or a publicly-financed candidate.54 The
provision did not abridge a candidate’s First Amendment rights
because it gave the candidate the choice of limiting his campaign
spending and was narrowly tailored and logically related to furthering
the state’s compelling interest in encouraging candidates to
participate in public financing.55 As such, the court upheld the
51. This note refers to candidates who choose to participate in a public financing scheme
as “publicly-financed candidates” and those who run under the traditional private campaign
finance system as “privately-financed candidates.”
52. 4 F.3d at 30 n.5. The trigger provided that when the outspending began, publicly-
financed candidates were: (1) released from their initial spending limits and free to raise private
funds in proportion to the amounts that their privately-financed opponents had already spent;
and (2) permitted to accept campaign contributions of up to $2,000 per individual contributor,
while their privately-financed opponent could only accept contributions of up to $1,000 per
individual contributor. Id. at § 17-25-30(3). The trigger’s purpose was to encourage candidates
to participate in the public financing program. 4 F.3d at 30.
53. Id. at 38-40. The plaintiffs claimed that the benefits afforded to publicly-financed
candidates were so attractive and one-sided that a candidate’s choice to participate in it would
not be truly voluntary.
54. Id. at 38. The court reasoned that the provision achieved a “rough proportionality”
between the advantages available to publicly-financed candidates and the restrictions they must
accept in order to receive those advantages. Id. at 39. While the court acknowledged that the
statutory scheme may not be in exact balance, it suspected “that very few campaign financing
schemes ever achieve perfect equipoise.” Id. The court explained that “a permissible choice
occurs where, as here, there is no credible evidence of a penalizing purpose, the choice between
the packages is real, uncoerced, and available to all . . . and the challenged disparity is
narrowly-tailored and logically related to compelling governmental interests.” Id. at 40.
55. Id. at 39-40. In turn, encouraging candidate participation in the public financing
program would tend to further the state’s compelling interests in facilitating candidates’
communications with the electorate, freeing candidates from fundraising pressures, and
combating electoral corruption. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91; Republican Nat’l Comm.,
487 F. Supp. at 285-86).
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provision.56
2. Day v. Holahan
In Day v. Holahan,57 the Eighth Circuit struck down a trigger in a
1993 amendment to Minnesota’s voluntary public financing statute.
The trigger allowed publicly-financed candidates to receive
additional matching public funds to combat independent expenditures
made on behalf of their privately-financed opponents.58 The plaintiffs
claimed that the trigger imposed an unconstitutional burden on their
First Amendment rights because it deterred non-candidates from
making independent expenditures.59 The Day court rejected this claim
and upheld the trigger, reasoning that it did not impair non-
candidates’ First Amendment rights.60 In fact, the court found that the
trigger actually enhanced First Amendment values about the issues
surrounding independent expenditures by fostering “free and public”
discourse.61
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit struck down the trigger using a
different analytical approach. The court found that the trigger
imposed a cognizable injury to the First Amendment rights of
56. Id.
57. 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
58. The statute defined an “independent expenditure” as: “an expenditure expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, which expenditure is made
without the express or implied consent, authorization, or cooperation of, and not in concert with
or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate or any candidate’s principal campaign
committee or agent.” MINN. STAT. § 10A.01 subd. 10b. (Supp. 1993).
Thus, when any individual or group made an independent expenditure of more than $100
on behalf of any privately-financed candidate, the publicly-financed candidate benefited in two
ways: (1) her expenditure limits were increased by the amount of the independent expenditure;
and (2) she received additional matching public funds equal to one-half the amount of the
independent expenditure. MINN. STAT. § 10A.25 subd.13.
59. Day v. Hayes, 863 F. Supp. 940, 946 (D. Minn. 1994) consolidation appeal with Day
v. Holchen, 34 F.3d 1356. According to the plaintiffs, the trigger would be a deterrent because
it forced independent spenders to choose between either not making an independent expenditure
or “subsidizing the campaign coffers of a candidate being opposed.” Id.
60. Id. at 947. The court reasoned that the trigger did not significantly restrict the
plaintiffs’ speech because they remained free to make independent expenditures without limit.
Further, their speech was not restricted merely because their independent expenditures triggered
an opportunity for their publicly-financed opponent to respond. Id. 
61. Id. at 947. The court noted that “[t]o the extent the statute provides for increased
debate about issues of public concern raised by an independent expenditure, it promotes the free
and open debate the First Amendment seeks to foster and protect.” Id.
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privately-financed candidates and non-candidates who wished to
make independent expenditures by deterring them from making
independent expenditures in the first place.62 Applying a strict
scrutiny test, the Eight Circuit concluded that it could not uphold the
provision because it was not narrowly drawn to serve a compelling
state interest.63 The court declared that Minnesota’s interest in
encouraging candidates to participate in its public financing scheme
was not “sufficiently compelling” because nearly all of Minnesota’s
candidates participated in the system before the inclusion of the
trigger in the statute.64
3. Wilkinson v. Jones
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
upheld a different statutory scheme in Wilkinson v. Jones.65 There,
the plaintiffs argued that a 1992 Kentucky public financing statute
allowing publicly-financed candidates to raise private funds and
receive public matching funds once the expenditures or contributions
of their privately-financed opponents exceeded $1.8 million (the
statutory ceiling) unconstitutionally burdened the First Amendment
rights of privately-financed candidates by coercing them to limit their
spending so as to avoid triggering matching funds for their publicly
62. Id. First, the court explained that “[t]he First Amendment affords the broadest
protection” for independent expenditures. Day, 34 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at
14). The court reasoned that to the extent that a publicly-financed candidate benefits from
matching public funds that were triggered by an independent expenditure, the political speech
of the independent speaker was impaired. Id. The trigger would deter speech because “[t]he
knowledge that a candidate who one does not want to be elected will have her spending limits
increased and will receive a public subsidy . . . as a direct result of that independent
expenditure, chills the free exercise of that protected speech.” Id.
63. Id. at 1361. The state declared its compelling interest was enhancing public
confidence in the political process by encouraging candidates to accept the voluntary spending
limits. Id. Under a “strict scrutiny” test, a campaign finance law which burdens protected
speech will be upheld if the court finds it is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling government
interest. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422, 1424 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990)). The Eighth Circuit
applied a strict scrutiny test after it deemed the trigger a “content-based” restriction because it
singled out political speech, which advocated the defeat of one candidate and/or the election of
an opponent. Day, 34 F.3d at 1360-61.
64. Id.
65. 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
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financed opponents.66 The court found that the statute promoted
“more speech, not less” and did not coerce or chill the free speech
rights of privately-financed candidates because the Kentucky General
Assembly narrowly tailored the statute’s public financing trigger to
promote the state’s compelling interest in encouraging candidate
participation in its public finance scheme.67 The court reasoned that
this candidate participation would promote greater political dialogue
among candidates and combat electoral corruption by decreasing the
need for candidates to rely on private fundraising.68
4. Rosentiel v. Rodriguez
In Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, the Eighth Circuit upheld a similar
trigger included in a 1996 amendment to Minnesota’s public
financing system that allowed publicly-financed candidates to raise
private campaign funds in excess of legal spending limits when their
privately-financed opponents began to outspend them.69 The
66. 876 F. Supp. at 927. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 121A.030(5)(a), 121A.080(4), (5)
(Michie 1993). The General Assembly acted largely in response to the record-breaking price tag
of Kentucky’s 1991 gubernatorial race, in which total candidate spending exceeded $19 million.
See Tom Loftus, Big-Money Politic$: With Growing Pressure to Raise Vast Sums, Even
Candidates and Contributors Are Calling For Changes, Courier-Journal (Louisville, Ky.), Dec.
29, 1991, at 1A.
The plaintiffs claimed they would be coerced because if they did not participate, the trigger
would (1) punish them for exercising their right to forgo the public funding option; and (2) chill
their speech by forcing them to restrict their spending in order to prevent the release of
matching funds to their publicly-financed opponent. Id.
67. 876 F. Supp. at 928. The court noted that the trigger took effect only when the
privately-financed candidate began to surpass the publicly-financed candidates’ $1.8 million
spending limit. Id. at 927. At that point, the court reasoned, the candidates would have already
generated a significant amount of speech on campaign issues. Id. Further spending would
simply promote more speech. Id. at 927-28. The court reasoned that the trigger was not coercive
because the privately-financed candidate retained complete control over whether to trigger the
release of matching funds to her opponent by outspending her. Id. at 927-28. The court was “not
convinced that[the trigger] impermissibly chills the speech of privately-financed candidates
simply because it enables the speakers’ adversaries to respond.” Id. at 928. The court noted that
without the trigger, publicly-financed candidates would be subject to absolute spending limits.
876 F. Supp. at 928. This would likely “discourage candidates from accepting public financing”
because they would risk being grossly outspent by their privately-financed opponents. Id.
Accordingly, the trigger was narrowly-tailored because it took effect “only to avoid a
circumstance in which the publicly-financed candidates may be unfairly disadvantaged. Id.
68. Id. (citing Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 26).
69. 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996). See MINN. STAT. ANN § 10A.25(10) (West 1996).
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plaintiffs argued that the attractiveness of this alternative coerced
candidates to participate in public financing and accept spending
limits— a violation of their First Amendment rights.70 The Eighth
Circuit disagreed. Instead, the court found that Minnesota’s public
financing scheme promoted “cherished First Amendment values” by
presenting candidates with additional campaign funding option; the
trigger did not compel candidate participation in public financing
and, therefore, did not burden privately-financed candidates’ First
Amendment rights.71 Even so, the court proceeded with a strict
scrutiny inquiry and concluded that the trigger’s emphasis on public
financing was narrowly tailored to serve Minnesota’s compelling
interest in reducing electoral corruption, decreasing private
fundraising, and increasing voter-candidate communication.72
5. Gable v. Patton
Gable v. Patton revisited the constitutionality of Kentucky’s
public financing scheme with a frontal attack on the trigger’s $1.8
million ceiling.73 The plaintiffs argued that the trigger’s ceiling
70. 101 F.3d at 1549.
71. Id. at 1550-51, 1552. Relying on Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 26, the court concluded that
the statute was not coercive because it “achieve[d] a relative balance between the benefits
provided to publicly financed candidates and the restrictions [they] must accept” in exchange.
Id. Further, the court explained that the inducements for candidates to limit their spending were
not “inherently penal.” Id. at 1550. They were simply intended to prevent candidates from
declining to participate in the public financing option because they risked being grossly
outspent by a privately-financed opponent. Id. at 1551.
72. Id. at 1553 (citing Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39, and Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 928). The
court reasoned that the statute was narrowly tailored to further these compelling state interests
because (1) the public financing was consistent with previous campaign finance plans that
satisfied strict scrutiny, id. at 1553-54 (citing Republican Nat’l Comm., 487 F.Supp. at 285-87;
Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39-40); (2) it merely removed candidates’ disincentive to accept public-
funding for fear of being grossly outspent, id. at 1554; and (3) it simply rewarded candidates
who adhered to spending limits until they began to be outspent by their opponent. Id. at 1553-
54. By not accepting private contributions, publicly-financed candidates could not become
indebted to their campaign contributors. Moreover, they could spend all their time interacting
with voters, rather than raising funds.
See supra note 63 for an explanation of a strict scrutiny test.
73. 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998). See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121A.030.1 (Michie 1993).
This limit applied separately to primary and general elections. Id. In order to be eligible to
receive public funding, the statute required candidates to raise between $300,000 and $600,000
in private funds. Id. § 121A.606.1. Once candidates raised this amount, they would receive two-
for-one matching public funds to provide them with up to $1.8 million in campaign funds. Id.
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coerced privately-financed candidates into limiting their campaign
spending to $1.8 million, “thereby forgoing protected speech,” but,
like Wilkinson,74 the court found this argument without merit. The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held that
even though the trigger might stifle speech “to some degree,” the
legislature narrowed its strictures to achieve Kentucky’s compelling
interest in keeping campaign expenditures at levels that would not
encourage actual or apparent corruption of the political process.75
Therefore, the trigger’s $1.8 million ceiling did not unduly burden the
First Amendment rights of privately-financed candidates.76 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed, explaining that conditioning public funding on a
candidate’s adherence to expenditure limits was constitutional in
spite of its potential for pressuring candidates to accept the
expenditure limits.77 The “substantial advantage” the trigger provided
to publicly-financed candidates did not rise to unconstitutional
coercion, although the trigger provided “very strong” incentives for
participation and placed candidates under financial pressure to
participate.78 It did so because the scheme was voluntary and relied
§ 121A.606.3(c). A privately-financed slate actives the trigger by raising or spending more than
$1.8 million in either a primary or general election; this includes contributions from the
candidates themselves. § 121A.030.5(a). however, the prohibition against accepting
contributions during the twenty-eight days proceeding either a primary or general election is
lifted for both candidates. Id. § 121A.030.5(a).
74. 142 F.3d at 947. The plaintiffs claimed the statute would coerce candidates into
accepting the public financing option because once the privately-financed slate surpassed the
$1.8 million ceiling, the statute placed publicly-financed slates in a more advantageous position.
Id. See Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. 916, and supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
75. 142 F.3d at 947. The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning resembled the district court’s logic in
Wilkinson by concluding that “even if ‘the trigger provision chills speech to some degree . . . it
is a narrowly tailored means which addresses a compelling state interest . . . in encouraging
candidates to accept public financing and its accompanying limitations which are designed to
. . . combat corruption.’” Id. at n.7 (alterations in original) (quoting Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F.
Supp. at 928).
76. 142 F.3d at 947.
77. Id. at 948.
78. Id. The court noted the district court’s example of how a trigger provision could
become unconstitutionally coercive. If, for instance, the state provided four dollars in matching
funds for every dollar the publicly-financed slate raised, the system would be coercive because
a privately-financed slate would have no way of remaining competitive once the publicly-
financed slate was released from its $1.8 million spending limit and began receiving the
matching funds. If candidates had no way of remaining competitive, they would have no real
choice but to participate in the public financing system. Such a system would be
unconstitutional because the state would effectively be forcing a candidate into accepting
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on incentive for participation, which, the court concluded, met
structuring the scheme so that participation was the rational choice.79
Citing Buckley v. Valeo, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
incentives did not differ in kind from triggers that offered “clearly
constitutional” incentives and upheld Kentucky’s trigger.80
III. THE 1996 MAINE CLEAN ELECTION ACT: THE MCEA’S
PROVISIONS
Prior to November 1996, Maine conducted its elections under the
traditional private campaign finance system.81 However, the public’s
increasing concern with the system fueled a grass-roots reform
movement.82 On November 5, 1996, Maine voters approved the
expenditure limits by providing overwhelming benefits to publicly-financed slates. Id.
The trigger provides a strong incentive to participate because publicly-financed slates
receive two-for-one matching public funding, which enables them to spend three dollars for
every one dollar they raise. Id. The court reasoned that there would “only [be] a narrow set of
circumstances under which a candidate could make a financially rational decision not to
participate” in the public financing system. Id.
79. 142 F.3d at 949.
80. Id. In Buckley, the court upheld a $1,000 limit on campaign contributions by
individuals, stating that “if ‘some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to
probe, whether, say a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000.’ Such distinctions in
degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in kind.” Id.
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (citation omitted)). The Gable court applied this principle to
the trigger provision and concluded that, “[a]bsent a clearer form of coercion,” the trigger’s
inherent incentives were “not different in kind from clearly constitutional incentives.” 142 F.3d
at 949. Similarly, the Rosenstiel court reasoned that a trigger was not “inherently penal.” 101
F.3d 1544 at 1550.
81. This meant candidates could raise and spend campaign funds without limit and were
permitted to solicit private sources including individuals, political action committees (PACs),
and corporations. See infra note 84 for Maine’s contribution limits prior to the MCEA’s
enactment.
82. The rising cost of statewide campaigns troubled Maine citizens. For example, the cost
of running a winning gubernatorial campaign in Maine increased by 1,610% over the last
twenty years (1974-1994). THE MONEY AND POLITICS PROJECT, ELECTIONS OR AUCTIONS?
WHO PAID FOR MAINE’S GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS? 4 (1995). In 1994, gubernatorial
candidate Angus King spent $1,657,875 ($1,061,186 of it his own money)to win the Maine
governorship. Id.
Citizens were also concerned that special interests exercised undue influence over Maine’s
elected officials by supplying the bulk of their campaign contributions. Public awareness about
the financing of Maine elections grew in part because of the efforts of The Money and Politics
Project, a nonprofit, non-partisan research organization that studies campaign financing in
Maine. The Money and Politics project published a series of studies detailing possible
connections between special interests’ contributions and elected officials’ actions in the 117th
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MCEA through a ballot initiative by a 56 percent margin, reforming
Maine’s campaign finance system in three principal areas.83 It
lowered the current campaign contribution limits, added provisions
designed to strengthen Maine’s Commission on Governmental Ethics
and Election Practices— the government body responsible for
implementing and regulating Maine’s campaign finance laws— and,
most significantly, created the “Clean Election Option,” an
alternative public-financing option available to candidates running
for Governor, State Senator, and State Representative.84 This option
becomes available to all qualifying candidates beginning with the
2000 elections; its passage established the nation’s first voluntary,
full-public financing alternative for political campaigns.85
and 118th Maine Legislatures. See JOHN BRAUTIGAM ET AL., THE MONEY AND POLITICS
PROJECT, CASHING IN: THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY WEIGHS IN AGAINST THE TIRED TRUCKER
BILL (1996); ROBERT COLLINS & MONICA CASTELLANOS, MONEY AND POLITICS PROJECT,
CASHING IN: GAMBLING INTERESTS BET HEAVILY ON MAINE (1996); ROBERT COLLINS &
MONICA CASTELLANOS, MONEY AND POLITICS PROJECT, CASHING IN: THE BLUE’S BID TO GO
FOR-PROFIT (1996).
Prior to 1996, the Maine legislature rejected various campaign finance reform proposals 40
different times. Public Campaign (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http://www.publicampaign.org/
statereform.html>. In response to the legislature’s inaction, the Maine Coalition for Clean
Elections initiated organizing efforts in 1995 in order to pass the MCEA via ballot initiative in
1996. Id. On a single day, “eleven-hundred grassroots volunteers collected more than 65,000
signatures” in fourteen hours, at a pace of 4,700 signatures per hour and successfully placed the
measure on the state ballot. Id. To qualify the initiative for the ballot, MCEA supporters were
required to collect 51,131 signatures from eligible voters. Election division, Statewide Citizen
Initiatives which May be Circulating, State of Maine (U.S.A.) <http://www.state.me.us/sos/ccc/
elec/pets98.html>.
83. Public Campaign <http://www.publicampaign.org/ statereform.html>. The Maine
Clean Election Act consists of Maine Revised Statutes Annotated title 21-A, §§ 1001-20A and
§§ 1121-28.
84. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, §§ 1015, 1123, 1126 (West Supp. 1997). Beginning in
1999, the MCEA lowers contribution limits for privately financed candidates from their
previous limits ($5,000 for political action committees (PACs) and corporations, and $1,000 for
individuals). Under the MCEA, the new aggregate contribution limits per candidate are $500
for gubernatorial candidates and $250 for all other candidates. The new limits apply separately
to the primary and general elections. They apply to individuals, political and other committees,
corporations, and associations. They do not apply to contributions made by candidates or
candidates’ spouses. Id.
85. Id. at § 1123.
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A. The Public Funding Provision: The Clean Election Option
Under the Clean Election Option a candidate may voluntarily
participate and receive certification as a Clean Election candidate if
the candidate qualifies and complies with all other applicable election
and campaign finance laws and regulations.86 Candidates who qualify
as Clean Election candidates are eligible to receive public funds
(“Clean Election Funds”) from a separate, specially-designated fund
for their primary and general election races.87 In exchange, Clean
Election candidates must agree to use only public funds for their
campaign expenditures; they may not accept or spend any private
86. Section 1125(1)-(5).
87. Id. Candidates must take several steps in order to receive certification as Clean
Election candidates. First, they must file a declaration of intent to seek certification as Clean
Election candidates. Id. § 1125(1). Second, they must collect a certain number of $5 “qualifying
contributions” from registered voters in their electoral district. Id. §§ 1122(7), 1125(3).
Gubernatorial candidates must obtain at least 2,500 qualifying contributions from registered
Maine voters. Id. § 1125(3)(A). State Senate candidates must obtain at least 150 qualifying
contributions while § 1125(3)(B),(C) State House candidates must obtain at least 50. All
candidates must collect these $5 qualifying contributions during a specific time period. Id. §
1122(8). Legislative candidates must do so between January 1st and March 15th of the election
year, while gubernatorial candidates must collect them between November 1st of the year prior
to the election and March 16th of the election year. Id. Once candidates file their statements of
intent and begin collecting qualifying contributions, they may not accept any campaign
contributions except for private “seed money” contributions. Id. § 1125(2). Seed money
contributions are contributions of no more than $100 per individual. Id. § 1122(9). Candidates
may use their seed money to pay for initial campaign expenses and for the process of collecting
qualifying contributions. § 1122(9). Candidates are limited to raising the following aggregate
amounts of seed money contributions: $50,000 for gubernatorial candidates, $1,500 for State
Senate candidates, and $500 for State House candidates. Id. § 1125(2)(A)-(C).
The Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices will determine the
amount of public funds (“Clean Election” funds) allocated to Clean Election candidates. Id. §
1125(8). The amount will be based on the spending average in similar races in the last two
election cycles. Id. For both primary and general campaigns, candidates receive funds equaling
the average campaign expenditures for candidates during all primary or general election races
for the preceding two cycles. Id. Candidates receive smaller sums when they are unopposed in
their primary race or, in the case of independent candidates, if they have no primary opponent.
See id. § 1125 (8)(B)-(D) for the amount of Clean Election funds distributed in uncontested
primary and general elections.
The Clean Election Fund’s revenue comes from the following sources: $5 qualifying
contributions; a voluntary $3 check-off on tax forms; allocations from the legislative and
executive branch administrative divisions; any unspent seed money returned by the candidates
once they qualify for the Clean Election funds; any unspent Clean Election funds remaining in
the hands of candidates after the election; voluntary contributions; and any fines collected for
MCEA violations. Id. § 1124(2).
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contributions— including personal funds— during the primary or
general election.88 Further, Clean Election candidates may use public
funds only for campaign-related purposes.89
B. The Matching Funds Trigger
Under the MCEA, Clean Election candidates may receive
additional public funds to match their privately-financed opponents’
spending when their opponents raise or spend campaign funds in
excess of the MCEA’s total spending limit.90 In calculating a
privately-financed candidate’s war chest, the MCEA factors in not
only the candidate’s total expenditures but also independent
expenditures made in support of the candidate as well as expenditures
made against the candidate’s Clean Election opponent.91 Thus, the
MCEA provides for the possibility that independent expenditures
made on the behalf of privately-financed candidates could trigger the
release of matching funds to the candidate’s Clean Election
opponents.92 However, even if a privately-financed candidate triggers
88. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 1125(6).
89. Id.
90. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 1125(9). Privately-financed candidates must abide by the
MCEA’s campaign contribution limits, which includes filing regular campaign finance
disclosure reports with the Ethics Commission so that the Commission can monitor the
candidates’ compliance with the limits. Id. § 1017. If the Ethics Commission concludes that the
privately-financed candidate exceeded the MCEA’s spending limits, it will dispense additional
Clean Election funds to the Clean Election candidate to match the excess spending disclosed in
the reports. Id. § 1125(9). As the campaign cycle wanes, privately-financed candidates must file
campaign finance reports with greater frequency to prevent them from vastly outspending their
Clean election opponents in the campaign’s final hours. Id. § 1017.
91. The MCEA defines an “independent expenditure” as:
[a]ny contribution or expenditure by a person, party committee, political committee or
political action committee aggregating in excess of $50 in an election that expressly
advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, other than by
contribution to a candidate or a candidate’s authorized political committee.
Id. § 1019.
92. Id. § 1125(9). If a non-candidate makes an independent expenditure that causes the
privately-financed candidate’s total spending to exceed the Clean Election candidate’s spending
limit, then the Clean Election candidate will receive matching public funds. When “[a]ny
person, party committee, political committee, or political action committee” makes an
independent expenditure, they must file a disclosure report with the Ethics Commission. Id. §
1019. The report must state: (1) an itemized list of contributions in excess of $50, including the
date of the expenditure and the name of the payee, (2) the purpose of each independent
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the matching fund provision, the MCEA limits the Clean Election
candidate’s matching funds to twice the amount he originally
received under the act.93
Supporters hailed the MCEA as innovative and comprehensive
campaign finance reform necessary to ameliorate the problems
plaguing Maine’s traditional private campaign finance system.94 Not
only does the MCEA’s voluntary expenditure limits control the cost
of state campaigns by forcing Clean Election candidates to adhere to
spending limits and donors who contribute to privately-financed
candidates to abide by lower contribution limits, but the MCEA
alleviates time-consuming fundraising by allowing Clean Election
candidates to concentrate their efforts into communicating with
voters.95 The virtues of the MCEA do not end there. It is argued that
under the statute election candidates are free from the influence of
large campaign contributions from special interests because the
MCEA forbids private contributions to Clean Election candidates.
While the Clean Election Option provides access to the political
process to qualified candidates who otherwise are precluded from
running a competitive political campaign because they lack the
wealth to fund a large war chest.
C. The Legal Challenges Directed at the MCEA
Upon enactment the MCEA received accolades from campaign
finance experts, elected officials, the media, and the public, all who
were anxious to use it as a model for similar legislation in other states
when constitutional scholars and campaign finance experts endorsed
its constitutional validity.96 However, being the first campaign
expenditure, (3) whether it is in support of or in opposition to the candidate, and (4) whether it
is made in coordination with a candidate’s campaign. Id. § 1019(2).
93. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 1125(9). For example, if a Clean Election gubernatorial
candidate initially received $1 million for his general election campaign, he could potentially
receive up to $2 million in matching funds.
94. See supra notes 13, 15, 19 and infra note 96 for the views of MCEA supporters. See
also supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text, discussing four fundamental problems with the
traditional private campaign finance system. See also Campion, supra note 19, at 2395, 2397-
98.
95. See supra note 94.
96. See Jezer & Miller, supra note 5, at 492 (asserting that publicly-financed elections are
the only way “to effectively assure that elections live up to rather than diminish the ideals of
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finance system of its kind, the MCEA inspired unprecedented legal
challenges.
The National Right to Life Political Action Committee
(NRLPAC) and the Maine Civil Liberties Union (MCLU) attacked
the constitutionality of the MCEA’s framework in Dagget v. Devine,
claiming that by coercing candidates into participating in the Clean
Election Option, the MCEA violated candidates’ First Amendment
rights by forcing candidates to limit their overall campaign
democracy”); Neuborne, supra note 19, at 21, 24 (asserting that public funding is constitutional
and “the best possible option under Buckley”); Jamin B. Raskin, Dollar Democracy, THE
NATION, May 5, 1997, at 11-12 (lauding a campaign finance system reform modeled after the
MCEA for its ability to “liberate the time and imagination of participating elected officials . . .
[and] enable new voices and new choices to emerge”).
See SPEAKING FREELY, supra note 9. For example, Former Representative Jim Bacchus
(D-FL) explained that “[t]he cost of public financing of political campaigns would be a pittance
compared to the cost incurred by the taxpayers due to the inadequacies of the current system.”
Id. at 116. Former U.S. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) recommended that an
effective campaign finance system have “spending limits and full public financing, so as to
completely eliminate the problem.” Id. at 114.
There is a plethora of editorial support for reforms modeled after the MCEA as an effective
method to control spiraling campaign costs, reduce special interests influence, and liberate
candidates from time-consuming fundraising. See Editorial, End Auctioning of Candidates,
GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE, May 31, 1997, at A5; Editorial (Wisconsin Rapids), Public
Financing Will Give True Reform, DAILY TRIBUNE (Wisconsin Rapids), Apr. 22, 1997, at 4A;
Rauch, supra note 19, at 54. See also supra note 17, 21 for additional examples of the MCEA’s
editorial endorsements.
Surveys reveal 68 percent of Americans support a campaign finance system modeled after
the MCEA. PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR A CLEAN MONEY, CLEAN ELECTIONS
APPROACH, (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http://www.publicampaign.org/ pollsumm.html>. But see
Smith, supra note 8, at 1085 (arguing that public financing is unlikely to achieve reformers’
goals of lessening the “allegedly corrupting influence of money,” leveling the electoral playing
field for candidates, or eliminating candidates’ incessant fundraising); David J. Weidman,
Comment, The Real Truth About Federal Campaign Finance: Rejecting the Hysterical Call for
Publicly Financed Congressional Campaigns, 63 TENN. L. REV. 775, 776 (1996) (claiming that
public financing would be neither a reasonable or viable method of campaign finance reform).
See BURT NEUBORNE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM & THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL
LOOK AT BUCKLEY V. VALEO, 18 (Brennan Center for Justice Campaign Finance Reform Series
1997) (explaining that the MCEA is consistent with Buckley’s holding that public funding can
be conditioned on spending limits); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Clean and Constitutional, BOSTON
REVIEW, Apr./May, 1997 (noting that among various campaign finance reforms schemes, “the
Clean Money Option is the least susceptible to constitutional challenge— at least under current
doctrine”). But see Joel M. Gora, Campaign Finance Reform: Still Searching for a Better Way,
6 J.L. & Pol’y 137, 160 n.101 (1997) (characterizing the MCEA model as unconstitutionally
coercive); Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign
Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 78 (Oct. 1997) (claiming that a proposal modeled after the MCEA is
“probably unconstitutional under the doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions’”).
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spending.97 According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, participation in the
Clean Election Option was not an option, but a compulsory
“alternative” that maintained a “profound disparity” between the
benefits available to Clean Election candidates and those available to
their privately-financed opponents.98 It did so because it conditioned
the grant of a governmental benefit— public funding— on the
relinquishment of the First Amendment rights of privately-financed
candidates and their supporters.99 This, the plaintiffs argued, was an
“unconstitutional condition,”100 because the overall effect was to
“penalize and chill” the First Amendment rights of privately-financed
candidates by deterring privately-financed candidates from
outspending their Clean Election opponents.101 It also deterred non-
candidates from making independent expenditures on behalf of
privately-financed candidates.102 The Dagget court ultimately
dismissed the case for lack of standing and did not discuss the
plaintiffs’ claims on the merits. However, the following section
analyzes the primary arguments the plaintiffs made in their complaint
against the Clean Election Option and, after considering both public-
financing jurisprudence and policy, concludes that the plaintiffs
97. Daggett v. Devine, 973 F. Supp. 203 (D. Me. 1997). Plaintiff’s Complaint at 26-29,
Daggett v. Devine (No. 97-56-B-H). See also supra note 20 for the other plaintiffs who joined
in the MCLU’s complaint. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976), the Supreme Court held
that involuntary limits on campaign expenditures were unconstitutional. However, conditioning
public funding upon a candidate’s voluntarily agreement to spending limits was constitutional.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65. Accordingly, the plaintiffs, in Daggett v. Devine, argued that
because the candidates’ participation in the MCEA was involuntary, the statute effectively
imposed mandatory spending limits on them in violation of their First Amendment rights.
Plaintiff’s Complaint at 26-29.
98. Plaintiff’s Complaint at 24, Daggett v. Devine (No. 97-56-B-H). The plaintiffs
claimed that Clean Election candidates were unduly benefited by, inter alia, the state’s
“endorsement” in designating them as “Clean Election” candidates; the initial grant of Clean
Election funds; and the triggered matching Clean Election Funds. Id. at 26-29.
99. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that the government may not
condition a governmental benefit on the relinquishment of an otherwise protected constitutional
right. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415
(1988) (“[G]overnment may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2, 26-29. See infra Part IV for an explanation of this claim.
102. Id. at 20-24. The plaintiffs claimed that the provision would burden non-candidates’
free speech rights by making them “decide whether to limit or to exercise their right to
unfettered political speech, knowing that if they exercise their right to unfettered political
speech they will trigger a publicly-financed response by the ‘clean’ candidate.” Id. at 24.
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complaint is without merit and endorses the constitutionality of the
MCEA.
IV. IS THE MCEA CONSTITUTIONAL?
A. Conditioning Clean Election Funds Upon a Candidate’s
Agreement to Spending Limits
The plaintiffs’ overarching claim that the Clean Election Option is
unconstitutional because it allegedly conditions the grant of public
funds on the relinquishment of privately-financed candidates’ First
Amendment rights, is without merit.103 The MCEA’s framework is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that public
financing is constitutional.104 The MCEA offers candidates a choice:
either run as a privately-financed candidate or run as a Clean Election
candidate using Clean Election funds as the only source of campaign
revenue.105 This choice is voluntary and does not burden candidates
First Amendment rights. Neither does the MCEA’s trigger provision.
Though the public financing systems upheld in Buckley and
Republican National Committee did not contain the matching funds
trigger found in the MCEA, the constitutional analysis is the same.106
In Buckley and Daggett, the drafters of both FECA and the MCEA
made rational determinations regarding the amount of money
necessary for candidates to run competitive campaigns; they simply
made their determinations in different ways based on the current
realities of campaign financing.107
103. See supra note 99.
104. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, and 
Republican Nat’l Comm, 487 F. Supp. 280).
105. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1123 (West Supp. 1997).
106. Weine, supra note 44, at 235.
107. Id. at 236. In Buckley, the Supreme Court deferred to Congress’ determination
regarding the amount of public funding necessary for presidential candidates to run competitive
campaigns. Id. at 235. In its determination, Congress relied, in part, on the average spending of
presidential candidates in prior elections. Id. Similarly, the MCEA’s drafters sought to provide
Clean Election candidates with adequate public funds in order to run competitive campaigns.
In order to achieve this purpose, they established a system that monitors campaign
spending during the election. Id. at 236. Given the increasing prevalence of both independent
and personal expenditures in recent campaigns, the MCEA’s trigger ensures that Clean Election
candidates receive adequate funding in the context of modern elections. Id. at 236.
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Even assuming arguendo that MCEA imposes some burden on
candidates’ First Amendment rights, the Maine legislature narrowly
tailored the statute to further the compelling state interests of
combating electoral corruption, curtailing rigorous fundraising, and
facilitating candidates’ communication with the electorate. This was
recognized as constitutional by the Supreme Court in Buckley and
Republican National Committee.108 The MCEA shepherds candidates
away from corrupt influences— actual or apparent— by forbidding
Clean Election candidates to rely on any private contributions; thus
avoiding becoming tethered to special interests through
indebtedness.109 Accordingly, the MCEA’s basic framework is
constitutional under Supreme Court precedent as a voluntary
campaign-financing alternative that furthers compelling state
interests.
B. The Matching Funds Trigger: Providing Matching Funds to Clean
Election Candidates When Their Privately-Financed Opponents
Begin to Outspend Them
The plaintiffs also argued in their Daggett complaint that MCEA’s
matching-funds trigger coerced candidate participation in a restrictive
public financing scheme by compelling candidates to either accept
the Clean Election Option (and its attendant restrictions) or limit
spending of privately-raised funds to avoid releasing matching funds
to their Clean election opponent.110 Either way, the state imposed
108. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91; Republican Nat’l Comm. 487 F. Supp at 285. See supra note
96; see also infra notes 122-25, 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing how the MCEA
furthers these compelling state interests).
109. With the exception of the limited number of $5 “qualifying contributions” and $100
“seed money” contributions that Clean Election candidates may accept. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1125. See also Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. at 928 (reasoning that Kentucky’s public
financing scheme was narrowly tailored to “combat corruption by reducing candidates’ reliance
on fundraising efforts”); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d at 1553 (concluding that the state’s
public financing scheme was narrowly tailored to reduce the possibility for corruption resulting
from large campaign contributions). See also Campion, supra note 19, at 2429-30 (asserting
that the MCEA is narrowly tailored); Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 890 (explaining that “[a]
voluntary spending cap addresses the corrupting influence” of unlimited spending because a
candidate who accepts the cap and, thus, reduces his demand for cash “subject[s] himself to
fewer opportunities for corruption and fewer constraints on his official activit[ies]”).
110. See supra notes 87-92  and accompanying text for an explanation of how the matching
funds trigger provides Clean Election candidates with additional public funds.
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indirect spending limits.111 This, the plaintiffs asserted, penalized the
“protected activities” of privately-financed candidates, thereby
violating their First Amendment rights.112 However, under existing
public-financing jurisprudence, upholding restrictions on campaign
expenditures when compelling state interests are at stake, this claim
also fails.
1. The Matching Funds Trigger Does Not Inflict a Cognizable
First Amendment Injury
The MCEA’s matching funds trigger does not burden a
candidate’s First Amendment rights.113 The MCEA does not
“penalize” privately-financed candidates for outspending their Clean
111. Plaintiff’s Complaint at 24, The plaintiff’s argument is as follows:
While the MCEA is touted as a voluntary, alternative campaign finance option, the
disparity created by the MCEA between a “clean” and a non-participating candidate is
so profound that in practical terms the decision to participate is in fact non-voluntary
and coercive. Whether viewed as providing inducements to participation, or penalties
for non-participation, the MCEA’s practical effects— particularly when combined with
the reduced contribution limits imposed by the Act— are the same: the imposition of
involuntary spending ceilings on the “clean” candidate, who feels compelled to
participate in the public financing mechanism, as well as on the non-participating
candidate and non-candidates, who must decide whether to limit or to exercise their
right to unfettered political speech, knowing that if they exercising [sic] their right to
unfettered political speech they will trigger a publicly-financed response by the
“clean” candidate. Instead of equalizing the process, the MCEA ensures that the
“clean” candidate has a substantial advantage over the candidate who either chooses
not to accept public financing or fails to qualify for it.
Id.
112. Id. at 28. Count nine of the plaintiff’s Claims for Relief reads as follows:
By using the funds raised or spent by a non-participating candidate as a trigger for
making additional public funds available to “clean” candidates and as a trigger for
raising the spending levels to which “clean” candidates have agreed, the matching
funds provision of the MCEA both coerces participation in the public financing
scheme and its attendant restrictions on expenditures, and penalizes and chills the
protected activities of non-participating candidates, all in violation of the rights of
candidates and their supporters to freedom of speech and freedom of association
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 28. Hence, the MCEA penalizes the First Amendment rights of the privately-financed
candidate and his campaign supporters by releasing matching funds to his Clean Election
opponent once his campaign spending breaches the MCEA’s threshold.
113. See Weine, supra note 44, at 232-36 (explaining why trigger funds do not inflict a
cognizable First Amendment injury); Campion, supra note 19, at 2423-26 .
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Election opponents; they remain free to either conform to or deviate
from the MCEA’s spending limits.114 The MCEA’s trigger also does
not “coerce” candidates to run as Clean Election candidates. Instead,
the MCEA offers candidates a permissible choice between running as
either a publicly or privately-financed candidate by tempering the
MCEA’s financial benefits with harsh restrictions. If a Clean Election
candidate exceeds the MCEA’s strict expenditure limits, not only
must the candidate return all Clean Election funds, but he exposes
himself to both civil and criminal liability as well.115 Given the fact
that the Clean Election Option limits matching funds to twice the
initial distribution, the MCEA does not stop privately-financed
candidates from outspending their Clean Election opponents.116
Privately-financed candidates are free to finance a robust campaign;
the MCEA’s matching funds provision only levels the playing
field.117
The plaintiffs’ assumption that the MCEA’s litany of financial
benefits “compels” candidates to run as Clean Election candidates or
spend within the MCEA’s expenditure cap ignores the fact that
financial remuneration is not the only reason a candidate might
choose the Clean Election Option. For instance, a candidate with the
ability to fund a bottomless war chest may nevertheless choose the
Clean Election Option for fear of the dubiousness that accompanies
114. See supra notes 60-61, 65-68, 80 and accompanying text (discussing Day, 863 F.
Supp. 940, Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. 916, and Gable, 142 F.3d 940). See also Weine, supra note
44, at 233-35 (explaining why permitting and encouraging a response to speech will not “chill”
the exercise of protected speech); Campion, supra note 19, at 2426-26; Raskin, supra note 96,
at 11, 15 (asserting that it is strange to claim that a matching funds trigger will have a “chilling
effect” on contributors and spenders, when such a provision really promotes First Amendment
values such as competition, dialogue, and equality); Burt Neuborne, One Dollar-One Vote: A
Preface to Debating Campaign Finance Reform, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 42 n.110 (noting that it
is “difficult to see why funding a response should be treated as an unconstitutional penalty”).
See supra notes 60-61, 65-80 and accompanying text (discussing Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. 916,
and Rosentiel, 101 F.3d 1544).
115. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 1127. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text
(discussing Vote Choice, 4 F.3d 26, and explaining what constitutes a “permissible choice”
between campaign financing alternative).
116. Id. § 1125(9).
117. See Kenneth J. Levit, Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of Buckley v. Valeo,
103 YALE L.J. 469, 492 (asserting that, under a public financing system with triggers, some
privately-financed candidates will “undoubtedly” continue to outspend their publicly-financed
opponent, even if such outspending triggers additional benefits to the opponent).
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traditional private campaign financing.118 No First Amendment rights
are abridged because candidates do not have a constitutional right to
outspend their opponents.119 Hence, the MCEA does not burden First
Amendment rights. Rather, it promotes free speech and debate by
allowing Clean Election candidates to amplify their message when
their privately-financed opponents threaten to mute their voice
through money.120
2. The Trigger Is Narrowly Tailored to Further Compelling State
Interests
Assuming arguendo the matching funds trigger does burden
candidates’ First Amendment rights, the trigger is constitutional
because it furthers Maine’s compelling interest in encouraging
candidates to participate in the MCEA and is narrowly tailored to
activate only when a Clean Election candidate’s privately-financed
opponent exceeds the MCEA’s spending limits.121 Without the
118. See SPEAKING FREELY, supra note 9 (documenting lawmakers’ disgust with the
pressures of constant fundraising). For instance, former U.S. Representative Mel Levine (D-
CA) recalls that raising money for his U.S. Senate race while serving in the U.S. House
“crippled my ability to do my job properly . . . or to run an effective campaign beyond the fund-
raising part of it.”) Id. at 42. Former Rep. Bill Green (R-NY) recalls: “We started [fundraising]
the day after Election Day, and I kept the campaign finance office going year round . . . .” Id. at
43-44. Additionally, candidates might also choose the Clean Election Option because of the
public’s growing distaste for the private campaign finance system. See supra notes 10-11, 13.
119. See Joel Bleifuss, Cleaning Up Elections, IN THESE TIMES, May 12, 1997, at 12
(quoting John Bonifaz, Executive Director of the National Voting Rights Institute, who
emphasizes that there is no constitutional right to outspend one’s opponent). The plaintiffs seem
to imply that such a right exists by claiming that privately-financed candidates are “penalized”
when they decide not to outspend their Clean Election opponents or when their outspending
triggers matching funds to their Clean Election opponents. If the right to outspend one’s
political opponent existed, however, the Buckley court would have never approved a public
financing system. Under a public financing system, participating candidates could potentially
outspend any privately-financed opponents who fail to raise as much money as the publicly-
funded candidate receives.
120. See supra notes 48-55, 60-61, 65-80 and accompanying text (discussing Vote Choice,
4 F.3d 26, Day, 863 F. Supp. 940, Wilkenson, 876 F. Supp. 916, Rosentiel, 101 F.3d 1544, and
Gable, 142 F.3d 940). Weine, supra note 44, at 234-35 (reasoning that triggers promote First
Amendment values because they increase the overall amount of public discourse in political
campaigns); Campion, supra note 19, at 2426-29.
121. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (noting that where compelling
governmental interests exist, Congress may place reasonable conditions upon expenditures of
public funds, even where they affect the exercise of First Amendment rights). See also supra
notes 48-55, 65-80 and accompanying text (discussing Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. 916, Vote
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trigger, candidates who would normally participate in public
financing would not for fear that their privately-financed opponent
would outspend them.122 Encouraging candidates to run as Clean
Election candidates also advances Maine’s compelling interest in
reducing actual or apparent electoral corruption and promotes
participation in the political process by allowing candidates without
personal wealth to compete for political office.123 It also frees
candidates from the rigors of fundraising by providing them with
sufficient funding to run a competitive campaign and more time to
communicate with the electorate.124
C. The Matching Funds Trigger: Providing Matching Funds to Clean
Election Candidates In Response to Independent Expenditures
The Daggett plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of the
mechanism within the matching funds trigger that releases additional
public funds to Clean Election candidates once their opponent’s
supporters use independent expenditures to campaign against them.125
The plaintiffs argued that the release of additional public funds
burdens the First Amendment rights of both privately-financed
candidates and the supporters making independent expenditures on
their behalf.126 Like their attack on the trigger itself, this argument
Choice, 4 F.3d 26, Rosentiel, 101 F.3d 1544, and Gable, 142 F.3d 940).
122. See Weine, supra note 44, at 226-27 (explaining why triggers are necessary to
encourage participation).
123. In Buckley, the Supreme Court recognized this goal as “vital to self-governing
people.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93.
124. See supra notes 27-41, 48-55, 65-72 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley, 424
U.S. 1, Republican Nat’l Committee, 487 F. Supp. 280, Vote Choice, 4 F.3d 26, Wilkinson, 876
F. Supp. 916, and Rosenstiel, F.3d 1544).
125. Plaintiff’s Complaint at 28-29, Daggett (No. 97-56-B-H). The plaintiffs also claim that
the trigger operates unfairly because privately-financed candidates lack control over their
supporters who make independent expenditures and, thus, can not prevent expenditures from
being made on their behalf. Id. at 4. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text for the
MCEA’s definition of “independent expenditure” and a description of the matching funds
trigger.
126. Plaintiff’s Complaint at 28-29. The plaintiffs directed three complaints at the inclusion
of independent expenditures in the matching funds trigger. First, it would “penalize” privately-
financed candidates when independent expenditures triggered funds to their Clean Election
opponents. Id. Second, it would coerce candidates’ participation in the Clean Election Option
because it would enable Clean Election candidates to “significantly outspend” their privately-
financed opponents. Id. at 29. Such outspending was possible because independent expenditures
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also fails.
1. The Trigger Does Not Inflict a Cognizable First Amendment
Injury
The MCEA’s does not “penalize” the First Amendment rights of
privately-financed candidates or their supporters. Except for the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Day v. Hayes, every circuit has upheld
campaign finance systems with public matching fund provisions
triggered by either a privately-financed candidate or his supporters
exceeding state mandated spending limits; this, the courts hold, does
not violate the First Amendment rights of either privately-financed
candidates or their supporters.127 Nor do triggers activated by
independent expenditures “chill” the supporters’ First Amendment
rights.128 The MCEA does not limit the amount of money supporters
can contribute to a privately-financed candidate,129 it only attempts to
inject a modicum of fairness into the campaign by providing the
publicly-financed candidate with funding equal to that of his
made on behalf of Clean Election candidates would not count towards their total expenditure
limit. Id. Third, the trigger would “penalize[] and chill[]” the protected speech of non-candidate
supporters wishing to make independent expenditures on behalf of privately-financed
candidates. Id. at 28. These supporters will be “far more likely” to limit their independent
expenditures, knowing that their spending could trigger the release of matching public funds to
a Clean Election candidate.
127. Day v. Hayes, 863 F. Supp. at 940. Weine, supra note 44, at 233-34 (“Each court
reviewing a trigger concluded that the trigger did not cause a cognizable First Amendment
injury because the government was not actually inhibiting speech.”). See supra notes 59-61, 65-
68, 73-80 and accompanying text. (discussing Day, 863 F. Supp. 940, Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp.
916, and Gable, 142 F.3d 940). See also Campion, supra note 19, at 2426-29; Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 360 (1989) (asserting that “it is hardly a sympathetic ground for
objection that speaking has the effect of triggering resources permitting one’s opponent to
reply”).
128. See Weine, supra note 44, at 16 (criticizing the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Day and
explaining that “[a] candidate’s First Amendment rights cannot be chilled by the ‘knowledge’
that an opponent will be able to respond to his speech”). See also Blasi, supra note 11, at 1323
n.143 (asserting that “[t]here is little reason to suppose that fewer independent expenditures
[will] be made under a [trigger] scheme” than under any other campaign finance scheme).
129. While the MCEA does not place a limit on the total amount of independent
expenditures candidates can receive, beginning January 1, 1999, individuals can not make
contributions to a candidate in support of the candidacy of one person totaling more than $500
in any gubernational election or $250 in any other election. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1015(1). The
limits are the same for political committees, corporations, or associations.
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privately-financed opponent.130 Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument,
allowing independent expenditures to trigger the release of matching
funds will not coerce candidates into choosing the Clean Election
option, because the MCEA limits matching funds to twice the amount
the Clean Election candidate originally received.131 Thus, the Clean
Election option does not allow publicly-financed candidates to
outspend significantly their privately-financed opponents, because
privately-financed candidates are always free to engage in unlimited
spending under the MCEA.
2. The Trigger Is Narrowly Tailored to Further Compelling State
Interests
The argument for allowing independent expenditures to trigger the
MCEA’s matching funds provision is the same as argument for
upholding as constitutional the matching funds trigger. The trigger is
narrowly tailored to further Maine’s compelling interest in
encouraging candidates’ participation in the Clean Election option
because it takes effect only when independent expenditures threaten
to disadvantage unfairly a Clean Election candidate.132 Given the
growing prevalence of independent expenditures in electoral races,133
potential candidates will be far less likely to participate in the Clean
Election option if independent expenditures do not trigger the
MCEA’s matching funds provision.134 Encouraging candidate
130. See infra note 131.
131. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1125(8)-(9).
132. See supra notes 48-55, 65-80 and accompanying text (discussing Vote Choice, 4 F.3d
26, Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. 916, Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d 1544, and Gable, 142 F.3d 940). The
Eighth Circuit in Day decided that increasing candidate participation was not a sufficiently
“compelling” interest because nearly 100 percent of Minnesota’s candidates were already
participating in the public financing system. Day, 34 F.3d at 1361. In contrast, the Maine Clean
Election Option presents Maine candidates with a brand-new campaign financing alternative.
133. See Weine, supra note 45, at 227 (explaining how the increased power and prevalence
of independent expenditures “has given candidates a new potential opponent” which may pose
an even greater threat than their actual political opponents); Carney, supra note 16, at 111-13
(discussing the growing use of independent expenditures); Ruth Marcus & Charles R. Babcock,
The System Cracks Under the Weight of Cash; Candidates, Parties and Outside Interests
Dropped a Record $2.7 Billion, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at A1 (noting that the
unprecedented sums that national political parties and outside interests groups spent on
independent expenditures caused candidates to feel like bystanders in their own campaigns).
134. Weine, supra note 44, at 226-27 (explaining that triggers help alleviate the concern of
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participation in the MCEA furthers Maine’s compelling interests in
reducing actual and apparent corruption in the electoral process by
removing the influence of political patronage and facilitating
candidate communication with the electorate by promoting more
robust political speech and debate.135 Thus, the MCEA and its
matching funds trigger are a constitutionally permissible alternative
allowing Maine candidates to choose the campaign financing option
they feel is most advantageous to their candidacy.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
LEGISLATION MODELED AFTER THE MCEA
The MCEA is constitutional. States drafting similar “Clean
Money” campaign reform legislation, however, should consider the
implications of the legal challenges to the MCEA and draft their
reforms accordingly.136 This section proposes several measures to
assist reformers in this endeavor.
Reformers should include a set of “Findings and Declarations” in
their campaign finance legislation to articulate the objectives behind
the legislation and explain the constitutional underpinnings of their
reforms.137 Such findings provide legislatures an opportunity to
candidates who accept voluntary spending limit that they would be unable to respond to
independent expenditures). See also Stein, supra note 33, at 782 (noting that triggers are
essential because candidates would not participate in a public financing system unless they are
insured protection from independent expenditures); Fred Wertheimer and Susan Weiss Manes,
Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1126 (1994).
135. See supra note 109 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the Clean
Election Option would help combat actual and apparent electoral corruption. However,
furthering the anti-corruption purpose is only possible if Maine candidates choose to participate
in the Clean Election Option. Candidates will be more likely to participate if the matching funds
trigger accounts for independent expenditures.
See supra notes 32, 38, 55, 61 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley, 424 U.S. 1,
Republican Nat’l Committee, 487 F. Supp. 280, Vote Choice, 4 F.3d 26, Day, 863 F. Supp. 940,
and Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. 916). The MCEA’s trigger will facilitate candidates’
communication by allowing them to respond when they start getting outspent by independent
expenditures. See also Weine, supra note 44, at 234-35 (noting that “each of the decisions
upholding triggers recognized that triggers advance, not chill, First Amendment rights” and
would increase the total amount of public discourse); Rosenkranz, supra note 96.
136. See supra note 23 for a list of states that are currently advocating, drafting, or
considering their own “Clean Money” campaign reform legislation.
137. Several draft bills, modeled after the MCEA, include a “Findings and Declarations”
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present evidence of the campaign finance problems the new
legislation seeks to ameliorate.138 Legislatures should bolster their
“Findings and Declarations” with several key elements designed to
insulate their reforms from judicial attack.139 First, reformers must
draft legislation consistent with the First Amendment by ensuring
that any public financing provision is voluntary and offsets the
benefits afforded to publicly-financed candidates with sufficient
spending limits so as not to “penalize” or “chill” the First
Amendment rights of privately-financed candidates.140
The legislature should also attempt to tie its reforms to a judicially
recognized “compelling” state interest— such as encouraging
candidate participation in public financing, eliminating actual or
apparent electoral corruption, increasing candidate communication
with the electorate, or freeing candidates from the rigors to
fundraising— to further inoculate their reforms against First
Amendment attack.141 Once identified, the reformers must show that
current campaign finance laws cannot achieve compelling state
interests by presenting evidence of specific problems with their
particular campaign finance system and showing that the new
section which lists the problems inherent in the private campaign finance system, the objectives
of the Clean Money campaign reform legislation, the compelling government interests that the
legislation, and explanations of how the legislation would further these compelling government
interests. See PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, MODEL LEGISLATION FOR CLEAN MONEY CAMPAIGN
REFORM, (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://www.publicampaign.org/model_bill/bill1.html>
[hereinafter CMCR MODEL LEGISLATION]; Clean Money, Clean Elections Act, H.R. 2199,
105th Cong. § 101 (1997); Clean Money, Clean Elections Act, S.918, 105th Cong. § 101
(1997).
138. Id.
139. Id. See also H.R. 2199.
140. See CMCR MODEL LEGISLATION, see also supra notes 27, 32, 38, 41, 44, 48-55, 60-
61, 65-80 and accompanying text; Campion, supra note 19, at 2423-29. See also Weine, supra
note 44, at 232-35. H.R. 2199, § 101(b); S. 918, § 101(b).
141. See id. Other compelling state interests may include: (1) leveling the playing field
between incumbents and challengers, (2) controlling the escalating cost of campaigns, and (3)
allowing more qualified candidates to run for political office regardless of their personal wealth
or access to wealth. See CMCR MODEL LEGISLATION; H.R. 2199; S. 918 § 101(b). See also
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 581 U.S. 604, 649
(1996) (Stevens J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Government has an important interest in
leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost of federal campaigns”); Neuborne,
supra note 96, at 19 (noting that other possible compelling interests could include “[i]mproving
the quality of campaign discourse, preserving confidence in the democratic process, increasing
voter turnout, and equalizing access to the ballot”).
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legislation is narrowly tailored to address these problems to further
the state’s compelling interests.142
As the MCEA’s “statement of fact” section does not include any
of these elements, the Maine Legislature must significantly expand
on this section to include as many specific factual findings as
possible regarding the state’s current campaign finance system to
bolster the reformers’ assertions.143 A number of states currently
collect statewide campaign finance data; however, every state
pursuing campaign finance reform should establish similar research
initiatives to justify public financing legislation.144 Providing detailed
142. For example, reformers should explain why their state’s campaign contribution limits
fail to effectively combat actual or apparent electoral corruption, free candidates from the rigors
of fundraising, or facilitate communications with the electorate. See CMCR MODEL
LEGISLATION, H.R. 2199, § 101(a), S. 918, § 101(a).
For example, drafters could document their state’s escalating campaign costs to help
explain why their state’s current contributions limits do not combat electoral corruption or free
candidates from the rigors of fundraising. Faced with the need to raise increasingly large sums
of money in limited increments, candidates will be compelled to devote increasing amounts of
time to fundraising and may possibly attempt to subvert the legal contributions limits.
As a starting point, reformers should document: (1) recent campaign finance scandals, (2)
average campaign costs in recent election cycles, (3) incumbents’ reelection rates, (4) the
prevalence of independent expenditures, (5) contributions by made by various special interest
groups, (6) the amount of time candidates devoted to fundraising, (7) public opinion polls
regarding the public’s view of money and politics. See CMCR MODEL LEGISLATION.
See supra notes 39, 67, 72 (discussing Republican Nat’l Comm., 487 F. Supp. 260,
Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. 916, and Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d 1544). For example, a Clean Election
bill’s trigger provision would further the state’s compelling interest in encouraging candidates’
participation in the Clean Election Option and is narrowly tailored because it would take effect
only to avoid a circumstance in which a Clean Election candidate would be grossly outspent by
a privately-financed opponent.
143. See H.R. 1823, 117th Me. Legis. 16-17 (1996). The MCEA’s Statement of Fact
consists of four brief paragraphs, in which the MCEA (1) establishes an alternative, publicly-
financed campaign financing option, funded by the Maine Clean Election Fund; (2) amends
laws regarding the Commission of Governmental Ethics and Election Practices; and (3) reduces
election campaign spending by capping the campaign expenditures of certified Clean Election
candidates and limiting the amount of money donors may give to privately-financed candidates.
Id.
See Neuborne, supra note 96, at 16 (advising future reformers to assemble factual findings
about the role of money and politics because “[t]he success of any future effort to reform the
campaign process is likely to turn on the persuasiveness of the factual record (not the factual
assertions) developed to justify it”). The Money and Politics Project also compiled extensive
factual findings regarding Maine’s campaign finance system. See supra note 82. While the
MCEA’s Statement of Facts did not include some of these findings, other states that are drafting
Clean Money bills should include factual findings from their campaign finance research.
144. For example, Missouri, Maine and Connecticut have non-profit educational
organizations that conduct research and analysis on their campaign finance systems. See also
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“Findings and Declarations” supported by a solid factual record will
legitimize public financing as a constitutionally permissible,
voluntary alternative necessary to further compelling state interests
and restore integrity to the electoral process. “If voters are to take
back democracy, they will have to do it state by state.”145
V. CONCLUSION
In 1996, the MCEA achieved unprecedented and comprehensive
campaign finance reform and prompted other states to emulate its
innovations.146 Campaign finance reform proponents are hopeful that
a significant number of states will enact legislation modeled after the
MCEA so that widespread public support for “clean money”
campaigns will eventually prompt federal legislators to pass similarly
comprehensive campaign finance reform at the national level.147 The
MCEA’s reforms ameliorate the fundamental problems with the
traditional, private campaign finance system and, assuming that it
survives any future constitutional challenges, will continue to serve
Public Campaign, The State Level (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http://www.publicampaign.org/
statesresources.html>.
145. Sign Up for Clean Elections, BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 19, at A18.
146. See supra note 23 for a list of states that are currently advocating, drafting, or
considering legislation modeled after the MCEA.
147. See Gerald F. Seib, Election Reform Goes Haywire, How to Continue, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 8, 1997, at A24 (lauding Maine and Vermont for adopting “Clean Money” campaign
reform and noting that further “[a]ction in the states might shame Washington into ending
partisan bickering over campaign finances”); Editorial, Campaign Reform Dead? Not
According To Public, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 1997, at 14A (positing that “[a]n explosive
demand for change in the states could be the force needed to end Washington’s stalemate [over
campaign finance reform] that protects the tawdry status quo”).
Even Congressional leaders acknowledge that states are creating reform momentum. In his
October 26, 1997 appearance on NBC News’ “Meet the Press,” then-U.S. Senator John Glenn
(D-OH) (and co-chair of U.S. Senate’s hearings on 1996 campaign finance abuses) observed:
States are beginning (to demand campaign finance reform). Sometimes the states lead
the federal government in areas of particular interest . . . Maine has already passed . . .
[campaign reform] for financing their own state campaigns and [there are] about 15 or
18 other states following that same lead, considering it right now . . . To clean up
national campaign finance, the scandal of it, I think will go to some sort of federal
financing of campaigns, and I think we should. That would be the biggest bargain this
country ever got.
Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 26, 1997) (cited in Public Campaign (visited
Feb. 1, 1998) <http://www.publicampagin.org/quotesmain.html>).
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as a “blueprint for national change.”148 However, states following the
MCEA’s blueprint must remain mindful of the legal challenges to the
MCEA when drafting their own reform legislation. Judicial reaction
to campaign finance reform in Maine and other states will determine
whether “as goes Maine, so goes the nation.”149
148. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of four fundamental
problems with the traditional private campaign finance system and how the MCEA is tailored to
address them. See also A Worthy Experiment in Maine, supra note 19, at A26.
149. Robert Kuttner, Campaign Reform Depends on Grass-Roots Action, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 25, 1996, at A10 (championing the MCEA’s reforms and concluding “let’s hope that as
goes Maine, so goes the nation”).
Washington University Open Scholarship
